A substantial number of papers have shown that as workers' compensation statutory benefits increase, reported claims frequency and severity also increase. While this seems to be a robust finding in the literature, it is not known how these moral hazard responses affect real productivity. Moral hazard is usually regarded as shifting costs from group health medical to workers' compensation medical, or from absenteeism to workers' compensation disability, with no real consequences on the output of firms. But moral hazard can reduce output in two ways: (1) in the misallocation of inputs due to "bad" cost information, or (2) in the loss of specific human capital, controlling for the allocation of other inputs. We employ two data sets to analyze the impact of the second effect, reduced manufacturing output due to the loss of specific human capital because of moral hazard. We find significant effects: a 10 percent increase in benefits leads to an estimated decrease in output, ranging from .3 to 4 percent, depending on specification.
participating in the disability process realize that this informational asymmetry exists and can turn the situation to their advantage.
Moral hazard increases workplace absenteeism when such informational asymmetries are used to increase the frequency or duration of workers' compensation claims. These additional claims are known as "moral hazard" because the costs of extra usage (above that in a full information world) are borne by all the workers and owners of the company indirectly through higher cost for health and insurance benefits (with offsetting reductions in wages 1 and possibly company profitability), while the benefits are captured by individual participants. Unfortunately, since all face the same situation, individuals have some incentive to use the system more than they would have if they were paying with their own money, or if their behavior could be monitored without cost.
Overwhelmingly, the extant literature indicates that workers respond to economic incentives provided by workers' compensation disability payments. 2 In the absence of moral hazard, a change in benefits would not cause a systematic change in the claims. However, claim severity and frequency tend to increase as benefits increase and as the waiting period prior to the receipt of wage benefits (a de facto deductible) falls. 3 Despite this evidence, the potential impact of moral hazard on real productivity has been ignored because moral hazard is primarily seen as a change in the incentive to report an accident, shifting costs from one type of employee benefit to another. For example, an employee may claim that a given condition arose from a job injury and seek workers' compensation benefits because their real health condition (broadly defined) does not qualify for short-term disability compensation. An extreme case of "claims reporting" moral hazard is overt fraud in which a worker facing a pending layoff claims injury benefits when no injury was incurred, either on or off the job. In both of these examples, employee claims shift costs: in 1 To the extent that compensating wage differentials may be imperfect, there may also be reductions in employment. 2 Workers' compensation insurance provides benefits to workers for on-the-job injuries. These benefits include unlimited medical benefits, partial wage replacement benefits during the period of disability (which depend on whether the disability is temporary or permanent), and vocational rehabilitation. Individual states establish specific parameters for the wage replacement benefits. Typically, these indemnity benefits will equal two-thirds of the injured workers pre-tax weekly wages subject to a state minimum and maximum. Permanent injuries may be compensated based on the degree of wage loss by a "scheduled" amount for specific injuries, or by some combination of the two. Again, individual states establish their own specific parameters. 3 Claim severity has been found to be positively correlated with benefits in studies employing individual insurance claim data (Worrall and Butler 1985; Butler and Worrall 1985; Currington 1994) , in studies employing insurance data for individual firms (Butler and Worrall 1988) , and studies using sample survey data (Johnson and Ondrich 1989; Johnson, Baldwin and Butler 1994) . Claim frequency increases with higher benefits in studies using aggregate data (Butler 1983; Butler and Worrall 1983; Chelius 1982; Krueger and Burton 1990; Ruser 1985; Worrall and Appel 1982; Butler 1994) , as well as those using microeconomic data (Leigh 1985; Krueger 1988; Ruser 1989; Hirsch, MacPherson and Dumond 1995) .
However, one disaggregated analysis, done by Moore and Viscusi (1988) , find--contrary to the aggregate analysis by Butler (1983) --that a lower rate of fatal risk is associated with higher workers' compensation benefits. Their study of fatal injuries may be picking up changes in real risk behavior and not measuring nominal or "claims-reporting" moral hazard. This is suggested in a simulation by Kneiser and Leeth (1989) , and in empirical research by Ruser (1990) and Butler and Worrall (1991) . the first case, costs are shifted between group health/paid sick time and workers' compensation medical/indemnity; and in the second case, costs are shifted between unemployment insurance and workers' compensation indemnity.
While such benefits-induced cost-shifting may not have much impact on real output, increased workplace absenteeism will lower output to the extent that the firm specific capital is important. As statutory benefits increase, absenteeism rises with a concomitant loss of firm specific capital. This loss in firm specific capital causes output to fall. While firm-specific capital can not be directly observed and estimated, the impact of lost firm-specific capital on output can be inferred indirectly. Since higher statutory benefits increase absenteeism (see prior research cited in footnote 3), evidence that higher statutory benefits also lower output provides indirect evidence on the importance of lost, firm-specific capital. This paper measures changes in output as statutory benefits rise by embedding the benefits replacement rate in a Cobb-Douglas production function. In the next section, prior research on the importance of firm specific capital is discussed. In the third section, the effect of higher disability pay on value-added in manufacturing, using an industry longitudinal sample, is estimated. In the next to the last section, the production model is estimated on a much larger longitudinal sample (state data), which allows for more variation in the benefits replacement rate, the key independent variable of interest in the analysis. Conclusions are drawn in the final section.
MORAL HAZARD AND THE LOSS OF FIRM-SPECIFIC CAPITAL
If moral hazard responses to disability insurance increase absenteeism, then real output will be reduced as firms lose specific human capital investments. Higher disability pay will lower firm productivity in two stages. In the first stage, real benefit increases can be expected to increase work-injury days. (Evidence for this first stage is cited in footnote 3.) In the second stage, the loss of firm-specific human capital induced by increased benefits lowers output. Researchers would like to observe directly how absenteeism affects workplace productivity, but the data do not allow us to do this. 4 Rather, the effects are estimated indirectly: by holding capital and number of workers constant, it is observed whether increases in lost work-time pay decrease output. This is the first study that examines the reduction in output resulting from potential firm-specific human capital losses from moral hazard responses to increases in benefits.
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Evidence on the importance of firm-specific capital comes both directly from evidence that job training enhances wage growth (Mincer 1988; Brown 1989) and indirectly from analyses of wage growth in longitudinal data sets (Topel 1991; 4 Oliver et al. (1994) report that more productive workplaces have lower absenteeism, but make no attempt to model the relationship or demonstrate causality. 5 The one earlier study of the relationship between benefits and productivity is Butler and Worrall (1993) , which also presented estimates of the impact of benefits on value added by manufacturers. This paper differs from that in a number of ways: (1) the effect of benefits on productivity was not its main focus, (2) it did not explore the ramifications that firm-specific human capital might have for moral hazard responses, (3) it employed a different specification, and (4) it used different data. Becker and Lindsay 1994) . 6 These studies suggest that firm-specific tenure increases annual wage growth from 1.5 to 6 percent, depending upon the occupational group and age (blue collar workers in Topel's sample exhibited wage growth of from 4 to 5 percent per year of firm-specific tenure). For an experienced labor force, the skill embodied in firm-specific human capital represents a substantial fraction of the productive value of the input.
To model the effects of firm-specific capital on output, assume that "labor" is a homogeneous function of the number of workers and the total firm-specific capital of those workers. Newly hired workers are assumed to have already acquired the appropriate level of general human capital. "General" human capital is regarded as being applicable to all workplace environments and can be purchased in the market. However, since "specific" human capital results from investments made jointly by the firm and the worker in previous periods, the market does not produce it. Firmspecific capital is assumed to be fixed in the current period, and thus the employer chooses the amount of physical capital, the number of workers, and future firmspecific investments in human capital.
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In this simple model, moral hazard can reduce output in two ways: (1) in the loss of firm-specific human capital, controlling for capital and the number of workers, and (2) in the "misallocation of inputs," which includes all inefficiencies associated with allocating the "wrong" number of workers. Perhaps the simplest example of the second type of cost misallocation would be that higher benefits more than proportionately increase the costs of insurance (ignoring, for the moment, the potential for offsetting wage effects), thus raising the cost of hiring more workers. The firm would then react to the higher labor costs by increasing capital relative to the number of workers. Hence, moral hazard may change the capital/worker ratio of the firm.
We do not attempt to measure this second class of resource misallocation in the empirical proportion of this paper. Rather, the impact that moral hazard responses have on real output through the reduction of firm-specific capital is examined. The bottom line is that even when the number of workers is held constant, the increased use of disability time induced by moral hazard responses will reduce the firm's "effective" labor because of the loss of firm-specific human capital that cannot be purchased in the market and cannot be replaced in the short run. As a consequence, moral hazard responses will cause output to fall even after controlling for the number of workers and the amount of capital. Abraham and Farber (1987) and Altonji and Shakotko (1987) . We do not consider the results of these latter two studies as they apparently employed inconsistently reported market experience data that seriously biased their estimates of the returns to firm-specific experience (see Topel 1991) . 7 While investments can be made in the current period, we assume that those investments are small relative to the stock of firm-specific human capital that is required. In particular, it is assumed that the firm cannot fully train new employees in a single period. 8 Another somewhat more subtle example of how firm-specific capital might be affected by moral hazard is through the investment profile offered by the firm. Higher workers' compensation costs induced by moral hazard responses would likely produce larger and relatively unproductive investments in safety training, when, in fact, the real level of injury risk was much smaller than the moral hazard driven insurance data would indicate. Hence, there would be too great an emphasis on firm-specific More formally, assume a simple production model in which output (Y) is a function of physical capital (K) and human capital (L):
Assume that L is a homogeneous function of the number of workers (N) and the firm-specific capital (hs) of those workers:
One example of such a homogeneous function would be that L is the product of the number of workers and the average firm-specific capital per worker, or any power transformation of that product. Firms are cost minimizers, and inputs are scarce (so that the marginal cost of firm-specific capital is positive, as is the marginal benefit). This implies that a decrease in firm-specific capital, holding the amount of labor constant, will result in less output. As argued earlier, moral hazard may affect output in two ways. It can change the capital/workers ratio, K/N, holding firm-specific human capital constant. Or, it can decrease hs, holding K/N constant. It is this latter effect that is estimated below. As disability pay rises, work absenteeism will increase, firm-specific human capital will be lost, and output will fall.
INDUSTRY LONGITUDINAL DATA: 1982 THROUGH 1992
The moral hazard impact on output is estimated from two separate longitudinal samples of value-added in manufacturing. 9 To separate the effect of moral hazard response from changes in other inputs, variation in both the disability benefit levels and the levels of other inputs is required. In this section, the variation in input configurations is maximized by looking at a sample of fourteen industries from the Census of Manufacturers (every fifth year) and the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (every non-Census year). While this sample maximizes interindustry variation in inputs and outputs, the intra-industry variation in benefits over the decade covered is slight. Indeed, in this first sample, paid disability is measured as all forms of paid disability including workers' compensation, shortand long term-disability, and paid sick leave.
To supplement the industry analysis, inter-state variations in value-added, employment, and disability benefits (solely in the form of workers' compensation payments) are examined in the next section.
safety capital relative to other firm-specific skills such as computer literacy and the latest production methods. 9 Value added is measured by the Department of Commerce by subtracting the cost of materials from the value of shipments for products manufactured. Hence, it provides a natural metric for measuring the moral hazard impact of lost time pay since wage costs do not directly enter into the calculation of value added. Hence, the decline in value added due to disability pay is not simply an accounting relationship.
The units of observation in this section are fourteen manufacturing industries from roughly 1980 to 1991 (some key variables are missing in 1981, so 1981 observations were deleted). To the employment and value-added information contained in the manufacturing data, paid-disability-benefit information from the Chamber of Commerce surveys (published in Employee Benefits) and capital data from Dun and Bradstreet were added.
Not only would it be nice to measure the direct impact of disability pay on output, but it would also be nice to link it with firm-specific human capital. If direct measures of firm-specific human capital were available, one of our hypotheses would be that the disability-benefits effect would be stronger where firm-specific human capital was greatest (that the interaction variable "firm-specific human capital*benefits" would be negative). In the absence of an actual measure of firm-specific human capital, a proxy is employed to measure this interaction.
Perhaps the best proxy for firm-specific capital, at the level of aggregation of this data, is the average industry-specific job tenure of employees in each of the respective industries. These numbers are calculated from the 1981, 1983 and 1987 Current Population Survey tapes (job tenure is recorded in these data on an irregular basis) and linearly interpolated for missing values.
10 On the basis of firmspecific capital accumulation alone, firm-specific capital should increase with tenure, and the "tenure*benefits" interaction variable should be negative.
To estimate the effect of sick pay on productivity, a Cobb-Douglas process is assumed in the empirical work (this is a slight variant of an approach used by Brown and Medoff 1978) where, y = output; K = capital; L = labor input, which consists of the number of workers, N, and their firm specific human capital, hs; and where and g(x) is a homogeneous function; which yields:
Taking logs on the both sides of (3), the equation becomes:
The value of the far right hand term depends on the average firm-specific capital per worker. Following the arguments given above, assume that this last term is a function of "tenure," "benefits," and "tenure*benefits," as follows:
Substituting this back into (4) yields the estimation equation in which ln(output) is regressed on ln(capital), ln(labor), tenure, benefits, and tenure*benefits. This last interaction regressor is a weak test for the firm-specific human capital interpretation of the effect of disability benefits on productivity--as discussed above, it is expected that the interaction effect will be negative. The results of estimating this specification, with and without a time trend, are presented in Table 2 .
11 All coefficients have the expected signs, but some of the magnitudes are surprising. In particular, the magnitudes of the capital variable were surprisingly small as they indicate sharply decreasing returns to scale for these industries. As expected, labor's relative "share" in output is much larger than capital's share.
The main focus of this paper is on the effects of the benefits, and the estimates indicate that increases in disability pay significantly decrease value-added in manufacturers. Figures in Employee Benefits from the United States Chamber of Commerce have disability benefits paid for the four following groups: workers' compensation, paid sick time, short-term disability, and long-term disability benefits. These were included as separate regressors in the model, each measured relative to total payroll in the respective industries. The restriction that they have the same effect on value-added was tested, and--as the last row indicates--the null hypothesis that they have the same effect in any of the four specifications could not be rejected. Hence, the null hypothesis of a uniform marginal effect of benefits on the log of value-added in Table 2 is maintained. However in specifications without the restriction, it is instructive to note that the workers' compensation coefficients seem to have the larger, more significant impact on value-added. 12 11 Estimates were also attempted with industry dummy variables, but there was so little intra-industry variation by industry that neither the capital nor labor coefficients were statistically significant, although the benefit effects were still negative as reported here. Omitting the benefit variables in the specifications did not substantially change the magnitudes of any of the coefficients. 12 In the no (tenure*benefit) interaction specification without year effects, the respective coefficients for the first two left hand models are (with absolute t-statistics in parenthesis): -. 
Notes: F-statistic a = F-test for equality of the workers' compensation, short term disability, long-term disability, and paid sick time coefficients. F-statistic b = F-test for the joint significance of 'benefits" and 'tenure*benefits' interaction. All models had 139 observations. Consistent with the hypothesis that increases in disability pay lowers real output through the loss of firm-specific human capital, the benefits and tenure*benefits coefficients are negative. The implied elasticities from the first and third columns, without the interaction effects, are -0.42 and -0.37 respectively. The implied elasticities from the second and fourth columns, with the interaction effects, are -0.47 and -0.43 respectively. This indicates a substantial impact on real output of changes in disability--a ten percent increase in real disability pay yields about a four percent reduction in output.
The reader is cautioned, however, that there is a potential endogeneity problem using the survey manufacturing employment data. Since the number employed includes all persons on sick leave, the data overstate the number actually working--and it is the average number actually working that is consistent with our theoretical model. If the proportion not working is relatively constant over time and across industries, then this will not bias our results. But this is not expected to be the case, a priori. Hence, these results were checked with two auxiliary regressions. In order to check for variations in hours not fully captured by the employment variable, we re-estimated the model using total employment multiplied by average hours worked. The results, and the implied elasticities, were virtually identical to those reported in Table 2 . But multiplying the reported employment by average hours does not fully overcome the problem of having workers on sick leave, because the total employment variable still overstates working employment. Therefore, instrumental variables for total employment and the other right-hand side variables (benefits by type, and dummy industry variables) were also used. The results of the instrumental variables regression--reported in Appendix Table 2 --were virtually identical to those reported in Table 2 .
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STATE LONGITUDINAL DATA: 1954 THOUGH 1991
Because most of the effects in the inter-industry manufacturing sample comes from between-industry variation rather than changes over time within an industry, the variation of the benefits variable is relatively small. To increase the variance of the benefits variable, impact of benefits was estimated on a longitudinal sample of states 14 from 1954 through 1991. The longer time period allows for significant 13 It may be hypothesized that higher disability benefits are associated with lower value-added simply because lower value-added industries are riskier. In fact, the opposite is true, at least across 1-digit industries where fatality rates and gross domestic output measures are available. The Pearson correlation between fatality rates and output per worker is .28, while the Pearson correlation between the log of fatality rates and the log of output per worker is .34 (authors' calculations, using a longitudinal data set with 1-digit industries and data from 1965 to 1993). The instrumental variables used to predict the log of the employment variable in Appendix Table  2 included all those variables in Table 2 , proportion of male workers, and year and industry dummy variables. The R 2 was .96 for the prediction equation. 14 The states in the sample are those reporting over the whole period to the National Council on Compensation Insurance: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Iowa, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, variation in benefits, even within a given state. The cost of this variation is that we can only examine the impact of workers' compensation benefits since we do not have information on the physical capital stock or firm-specific capital by state. To compensate for this a time-trend variable and the annual average interest rate for three-month treasury bills are included. Since the t-bill variable is placed in the model to pick up the demand for capital, this demand should fall as interest rates rise, which in turn should lower output. Hence, the t-bill variable is expected to have a negative coefficient in the value-added regressions.
An advantage of the state longitudinal sample is a richer set of variables that can be used to measure the effect of benefits. Three such variables are available. The first, actual workers' compensation indemnity payments per worker, corresponds with the only measure available in the manufacturing longitudinal sample used in the previous section. This measure is based on first reports of injuries available from the unit statistical plan of the National Council on Compensation Insurance.
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Since the actual payment variables compound economic incentives (marginal benefits) with actual behavioral responses to those incentives (through frequency and severity reactions to those marginal benefits), two other measures of incentives to use the workers' compensation disability system are included. The first is the expected indemnity benefits of workers filing temporary total disability claims, given the aggregate wage distribution.
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This variable is a better measure of incentives than actual average payments. Butler and Appel (1990) show that most of the variation in expected benefits is the result of changes in the maximum payments available. The second alternative measure of moral hazard incentives is the weekly, temporary, total disability maximum payment. Since the availability of these benefit measures varies, means for the three alternative samples are given in Table 3 . Note that all three of the incentive variables are measured relative to the average non-agricultural wage. 17 Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Vermont. 15 These are policy year variables that have been adjusted to a January to December basis. 16 All indemnity claims start out as temporary total disability claims, though a small fraction may become permanent (partial or total) disability claims. Roughly sevnty-seven percent of all indemnity claims are temporary total disability only claims (see Table 1 -1 in Appel and Borba [1988] ), though most of the disability payments go to those with permanent disabilities. However, for most states, benefit indices for permanent injuries will be highly correlated with temporary total benefits. Data on statutory benefits comes from various issues of Analysis of Workers' Compensation Laws. The calculation of the expected benefit variable is discussed in Butler (1983) . 17 The third column measures the weekly maximum relative to the annual wage, but has been normalized to be comparable to the values in the first two columns. Table 4 replicates the Cobb-Douglas specification used for the previous sample of manufacturers. Because of the lengthy time period over which these effects are estimated, and there were significant changes in the cost of medical care and in benefits law, a variable for the relative cost of medical care and a dummy variable for the period after the release of the 1971 report of the National Commission on Workmen's Compensation Laws are included. Changes in the cost of medical care affects treatment patterns and hence return to work outcomes. In particular, lower medical costs encourages the use of "early, goods intensive" interventions (i.e., the sports medicine approach to care), speeding up the return to work and lowering absenteeism. As the price of health care increases, there will be less use of the sports medicine approach, returns to work will increase along with absenteeism, and value-added will fall as firm-specific capital is lost. The postCommission dummy variable also captures employers' responses to non-benefit changes in workers' compensation laws: after 1971, many states followed the National Commission's recommendations and made workers' compensation compulsory and eliminated statutory time and dollar limits on medical care and rehabilitation services. These changes have an ambiguous effect on returns to work in the model.
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None of the results reported here is sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of any of the last four variables listed in Tables 4 and 5 . Since there is considerable variation both over time and across states in the key variables, results are presented both with and without state effects.
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The estimates indicate that over the whole period, real value-added in manufacturing increased about three and one-half per cent per year, even after Independent Variables in Regressions Because most of the variation in benefits is common across state over time, we expect our results to be sensitive to time trends. Indeed, while results without a time trend in the model are virtually identical to those reported in Table 4 (with the linear time trend), results with higher order trend terms or dummy variables for each year vary considerably from those reported in Table 4 . In particular, all the other independent variables, except employment, tend to be statistically insignificant, and the benefits variables sometimes reverses sign.
controlling for these other factors. The coefficient for the relative medical costs variable is negative as expected, consistent with our firm-specific capital paradigm. The dummy variable for the post-Commission period indicates that non-indemnity changes in workers' compensation decreased output from three to four percent. The t-bill (interest rate) coefficient is always negative and statistically significant, consistent with our expectations (as a control variable for the omitted capital input). The coefficients for the employment variable indicate that output varies proportionately with the amount of labor input. The benefit coefficient is always negative and usually statistically significant. The relevant output elasticities with respect to benefits are given as follows: These estimates of output-reducing effects of moral hazard responses are an order of magnitude smaller than those using the inter-industry data in the previous section, but of the same sign. 20 For the preferred specifications in the four righthand columns, the elasticities range between -.03 and -.12. Hence a ten percent increase in benefits leads to one half to one percent reduction in output, consistent with our hypothesis.
GROWTH OF PAID DISABILITY AND OUTPUT
The two alternative samples yield significantly different estimates of the moral hazard productivity effects. Which are the more reasonable? Undoubtedly, only further research will provide a decisive answer to this question, but back of the envelope calculations can be made that seems to favor the smaller, state longitudinal estimates. Suppose that output is produced by a constant returns to scale production technology and that (drawing upon the firm-specific human capital literature discussed earlier) firm-specific human capital accounts for about five percent of the total value of inputs. Then, holding capital and number of workers constant, it follows that 20 The respective elasticities for a linear production function in which real value added in manufacturing is regressed on the number of manufacturing employees (a specification without logs) are, going from left to right: -.05, -.07, -.25, -.21, -.11, and -.05. These elasticities are always larger, on average twice the magnitude, of those using the logarithmic specification. 
The middle term on the right-hand side is 1; firm-specific human capital falls proportionately with work time. Hence, the value of the derivative preceding the equals sign depends on the elasticity of benefit utilization in the workplace disability system. Butler (1994) reviews the literature for estimates of this elasticity for the workers' compensation system--as well as provides additional estimates--and finds that a conservative overall estimate of the last right-hand term is about -.6 (the sum of the frequency and duration elasticity). This suggests that the left-hand term in equation 6--the partial, firm-specific human capital effect of benefits--is about -.03, roughly similar to the most conservative estimates in the previous section for the state longitudinal data (see Table 5 and footnote 18). The finding of significant moral hazard effects may explain why researchers consistently find large wage offsets for increases in the workers' compensation benefits (see Chelius and Burton [1994] for a review of this literature). report for their data sets that the wage offset more than pays for workers' compensation premiums; i.e., that the net workers' compensation premium is negative. If this is truly the case, why do firms appear to be genuinely opposed to real statutory benefit increases? Moore and Viscusi argue that the explanation lies in the difference between marginal and intra-marginal responses in wages to benefit increases. These results provide another potential explanation: statutory increases in benefits have real consequences for firms in terms of lost firm-specific human capital. Hence, wage offsets not only need to reflect the value of the injury benefits to the worker, they need also reflect the value of lost output to the firm.
Beyond its potential importance in explaining compensating wage differentials, moral hazard losses appear to a non-trivial economic phenomena. Since the average annual real rate of growth in the replacement rate has been 1.8 percent since 1971, 21 this implies that value-added in manufacturing falls by about .05 percent annually due to the moral hazard losses of the type we estimate here. Since value-added in manufacturing was $1.4 trillion in 1992, these moral hazard related losses would amount to almost $800 million in 1992. If moral hazard losses were also present in other sectors of the economy, or if any of our other (less conservative) estimates of the moral hazard elasticity are used, then these losses would be even greater. While the crude nature of the data employed (and the variance in the estimated effects) precludes definitive statements, certainly this is an area that deserves further research. 
APPENDIX
